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03-633 Roper v. Simmons
Ruling Below (Simmons v. Roper, S. Ct. Mo., 112 S.W.3d 397, 2003 Mo. Lexis 123)
The Supreme Court of Missouri found a national consensus against the death penalty for
juveniles. It held that juvenile executions violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. This outcome was decided in light of the 2003 United States Supreme
Court decision, Atkins v. Virginia, finding a national consensus against the execution of mentally
retarded offenders. The Missouri court, like the United States Supreme Court in Atkins, looked to
relevant legislative enactments, evidence of how juries view the propriety of execution, and the
views of respected national and international organizations in determining that society's evolving
standards of decency had come to a consensus against the juvenile death penalty.
Question Presented: Whether a national consensus exists against the execution of juveniles so
that the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile defendants constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?
State ex. rel. Christopher SIMMONS, Petitioner,
V.
Donald P. ROPER, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri
Decided August 26, 2003
STITH, Laura Denvir, Judge:
Christopher Simmons was sentenced to
death for a murder he committed when he
was 17 years old. He argues that to execute
him for a crime he committed when he was
under 18 constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma the Supreme
Court of the United States held that it
constituted cruel and unusual punishment to
execute persons who were 15 years of age or
younger at the time of their offense. The
following year, in Stanford v. Kentucky the
Supreme Court held that there was not then
a national consensus against the execution of
those who were 16 or 17 years old at the
time of their crimes and declined to bar such
executions. On that same day, the
Supreme Court held that there was not then
a national consensus to bar the execution of
those who were mentally retarded.
In 1993, Christopher Simmons murdered
Shirley Crook. Because of Stanford, he did
not argue that his age constituted a bar to
imposition of the death penalty, although he
did argue that his age was a mitigating
circumstance. He was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death in
accordance with the jury's verdict. This
Court affirmed his conviction and death
sentence, as well as the denial of post-
conviction relief.
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Last year in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 122 S. Ct. 2242
(2002), the Supreme Court held that a
national consensus had emerged against the
execution of mentally retarded offenders
since Penry. Mr. Simmons now asks us to
hold that a similar consensus against the
execution of juveniles has developed since
Stanford, that the rationale for the Supreme
Court's determination that the execution of
juveniles was not cruel and unusual
punishment has disappeared, and that the
Eighth Amendment bars his execution.
[The court here notes that the terms
"juvenile death penalty and "juvenile
executions" are terms of art referring to the
execution of those who were under 18 at the
time of their crimes, despite the fact that
under Missouri law, 17-year-olds are not
considered juveniles. Sixteen-year-olds,
though considered juveniles in Missouri, are
subject to the death penalty as well.]
[.. . I [T]his Court finds the Supreme Court
would today hold such executions are
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments ... .
(The Court discusses the retroactive
application of its decision, rejecting
Missouri's argument that Simmons' claim
should be barred because he did not do so at
trial.)
NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST
EXECUTION OF JUVENILES AND THE
MENTALLY RETARDED
To determine whether the application of the
death penalty to juveniles constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, it is helpful to
examine the Supreme Court's decisions in
prior cases addressing the execution of
juveniles and of the mentally retarded.
The Death Penalty for Juveniles:
Thompson and Stanford.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma. In Thompson
the Supreme Court determined that the
Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits
the execution of those who were 15 years
old or younger at the time of their crimes.
Using an approach similar to that which he
would utilize in Atkins some fourteen years
later, Justice Stevens, in the principal
opinion, said that in determining what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
judges should be "guided by the 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."'
To determine current standards of decency,
Thompson examined: (a) relevant legislative
enactments, and (b) evidence of how juries
viewed the propriety of execution of the
mentally retarded. It also considered (c) the
views of respected national and international
organizations. Finally, in light of the above
and other factors, (d) the Supreme Court
made its own judgment as to the propriety of
such executions [. . .] .
a. Legislative Enactments. In reviewing
statutes governing punishment of children,
Thompson found that "the line between
childhood and adulthood is drawn in
different ways by various States." Fourteen
state legislatures then barred capital
punishment altogether. In nineteen other
states, the legislature permitted capital
punishment, but state statutes failed to
expressly state the minimum age for its
imposition. Eighteen remaining states set a
minimum age, varying from 16 to 18. No
legislature had adopted a statute explicitly
permitting the execution of those under age
16.
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b. Imposition of the Death Penalty.
Thompson also found that juries rarely
imposed the death penalty on those under
16, that only eighteen to twenty such
persons had been executed in the 20th
century, and only one since 1948. Between
1982 and 1986, only five persons age 15 or
younger were sentenced to death in the
United States, leading the Court to conclude
that, "these five young offenders have
received sentences that are 'cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual."'
c. National and International Views. As a
part of its discussion of legislation, the
Supreme Court considered the views of
respected national religious, social, and
professional organizations, including the
American Bar Association ("ABA") and the
American Law Institute, both of which it
said "have formally expressed their
opposition to the death penalty for
juveniles." And, stating that it had
"previously recognized the relevance of the
views of the international community in
determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual," the Court also considered the
sentencing practices of European and other
countries, stating:
Although the death penalty has not
been entirely abolished in the United
Kingdom or New Zealand (it has
been abolished in Australia, except
in the State of New South Wales,
where it is available for treason and
piracy), in neither of those countries
may a juvenile be executed. The
death penalty has been abolished in
West Germany, France, Portugal,
The Netherlands, and all of the
Scandinavian countries, and is
available only for exceptional crimes
such as treason in Canada, Italy,
Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile
executions are also prohibited in the
Soviet Union.
d. Independent Analysis. Lastly, Thompson
analyzed the culpability of juveniles as
compared to adults and considered whether
application of the death penalty to juveniles
measurably contributed to the social
purposes it was intended to serve. After
noting "broad agreement on the proposition
that adolescents as a class are less mature
and responsible than adults" and "the special
mitigating force of youth," the Court
concluded that "less culpability should
attach to a crime committed by a juvenile."[.
. .].
In light of all of these factors, Thompson
concluded that a national consensus existed
that execution of persons under 16 at the
time of their crimes constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. Stanford v. Kentucky. The following
year, in Stanford, Justice Scalia stated in the
principal opinion that, by contrast, the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not
prohibit imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed at age 16 or 17. In so
holding, Justice Scalia agreed that what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
must be determined by current standards
rather than by those in effect in 1789. But,
he said, current standards are almost entirely
to be determined by reference to "statutes
passed by society's elected representatives,"
and specifically by state legislatures. He
then noted that, while the majority of states
did not permit the execution of juvenile
offenders, that count included the fourteen
states that then barred capital punishment
altogether. If one considered only those
states permitting capital punishment, then
the majority of that subgrouping approved
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the execution of those who were 16 or 17 at
the time of their offense.
And, although Stanford recognized that
juries sentence substantially fewer juveniles
than adults to death, it said this did not
provide a reason to prohibit such death
sentences entirely. [. . .] Similarly, although
a year earlier Thompson had said the views
of social, professional, and religious groups,
as well as the sentencing practices of other
countries, were relevant to determining
current standards of decency, Stanford stated
that the views of national organizations were
an "uncertain foundation" on which to base
constitutional law and that international
practices were simply irrelevant to whether a
national consensus existed. [ .. ]
From Penry to Atkins: Development of a
National Consensus Against Execution of
the Mentally Retarded.
1. Penry v. Lynaugh. The same day that the
Supreme Court held in Stanford that there
was no national consensus against
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles,
it held in Penry, an opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor, that there was also no
national consensus against imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded. Like
Thompson and Stanford, Penry recognized
that what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is not a static concept,
immutably tied to what punishments would
have been included within the reach of the
Eighth Amendment when the Bill of Rights
was adopted in 1789. Rather, the
"prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments also recognizes the 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."' And, like Stanford,
Penry looked to statutes passed by state
legislatures as the best type of "objective
evidence of how our society views a
particular punishment today." Penry also
said that the Court "looked to the data
concerning the actions of sentencing juries."
I1...]I
(The Court discussed legislative action and
other considerations, which factored into the
Penry decision.)
2. Atkins v. Virginia. In 2002, the Supreme
Court revisited the issue of capital
punishment of the mentally retarded in the
case of Daryl Atkins, an allegedly mentally
retarded man whose death sentence had been
affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court
based on Penry's determination that there is
no national consensus against the execution
of the mentally retarded. In a principal
opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme
Court reversed Mr. Atkins' death sentence
and remanded for a determination of his
mental status. Atkins. In so holding, Atkins
reaffirmed that whether capital punishment
is barred for certain classes of offenders is
necessarily part of a fluid, rather than a
static, process and that as our standards of
decency evolve, so will the determination of
what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
Atkins' analysis more closely resembles that
in Thompson than that in Stanford. [.. .1
a. Legislative Action. Atkins found that, in
the thirteen years after Penry, fourteen more
states including Missouri had adopted
legislation barring the application of their
death penalty laws to the mentally retarded.
And, while New York and Nebraska had
each reinstated the death penalty, each had
specifically exempted the mentally retarded
from the reach of those newly enacted
statutes. When these sixteen new states were
added to the two states that had already
adopted such legislation in 1989, eighteen
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states, and the federal government, then
prohibited imposition of the death penalty
on the mentally retarded. In addition, the
Court noted that the Texas legislature had
unanimously adopted a bill barring the
execution of the mentally retarded, but the
bill was vetoed by the governor on other
grounds, and that at least one house of the
Virginia and Nevada legislatures had
similarly adopted bills barring the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.
While the number of states barring
imposition of the death penalty had clearly
grown impressively, the Court stated that,
"It is not so much the number of these States
that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change." This consistency was
further reflected by the fact that, since
Penry, no state had adopted a law permitting
the execution of the mentally retarded. The
Court found such consistency particularly
persuasive given the anticrime atmosphere
of the times[.]
b. Frequency of Imposition of Death
Penalty. The Court found that some states,
such as New Hampshire and New Jersey,
whose statutes nominally authorize the
execution of mentally retarded persons, had
not carried out executions of any persons in
decades, thus removing the incentive to pass
legislation barring execution of the mentally
retarded in particular. And, in those states
that still carried out executions, the Court
found, the practice of executing mentally
retarded offenders had become very
uncommon. [. ..]
c. National and International Opposition to
Death Penalty. Atkins stated that the
consensus against the death penalty for the
mentally retarded was evident . . . also from
the opposition to the practice from experts in
the field, noting "several organizations with
germane expertise have adopted official
positions opposing the imposition of the
death penalty upon a mentally retarded
offender," including the American
Psychological Association and the American
Association of Mental Retardation. The
Court also found the sentiments of this
nation's religious communities, and of the
world community, to be overwhelmingly
opposed to execution of the mentally
retarded. Finally, the Court cited to polling
data that showed "a widespread consensus
among Americans, even those who support
the death penalty, that executing the
mentally retarded is wrong." While the
Court stated that the opposition of these
groups was by no means dispositive, the
Court did find significant their "consistency
with the legislative evidence," stating that it
provided "further support to [the Court's]
conclusion that there is a consensus among
those who have addressed the issue."
d. Independent Judicial Determination.
Finally, the Supreme Court undertook an
independent evaluation of whether such
executions should be prohibited. It found
that neither the retributive nor the deterrence
justifications for the death penalty would be
furthered by executing the mentally
retarded[.]
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
SET OUT IN ATKINS, THOMPSON,
PENRY, AND STANFORD TO THE
EXECUTION OF JUVENILES TODAY
B. A National Consensus Against the
Juvenile Death Penalty.
[M]any of the same principles and factors
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that have guided the Supreme Court's
determination of the constitutionality of the
death penalty for the mentally retarded have
also guided the Supreme Court's
determination of the constitutionality of the
death penalty for juveniles. This Court
therefore will use Atkins' approach in
addressing whether a national consensus has
developed against the juvenile death penalty
since Stanford, looking at: (1) the extent of
legislative action against or in favor of the
juvenile death penalty; (2) the frequency of
the imposition of the death penalty on
juveniles in modern times, and the
frequency with which it is carried out even
when imposed; (3) national and international
opinion on the juvenile death penalty; and
(4) an independent examination of whether
the death penalty for juveniles violates
evolving standards of decency and so is
barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
1. Legislative Action Has Consistently
Been Against the Juvenile Death Penalty.
At the time of Stanford, eleven
the juvenile death penalty.
substantial, but not yet enough
a national consensus.
states barred
This was
to constitute
Since Stanford, however, and despite what
Atkins called the popularity of "law and
order" legislation, five more states have
banned the practice of executing juvenile
offenders. Two have done so by adopting
legislation raising the age of execution to 18,
and two have done so by newly reinstating
the death penalty, but only for those
offenders who were 18 or older at the time
of their offense. The Washington Supreme
Court has also held that its death penalty
statute cannot be construed to authorize
imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by juvenile offenders, thereby
adding the state of Washington to the list of
states in which the practice is now
prohibited. Thus, a total of sixteen states - to
which should be added federal civilian and
military courts require a minimum age of
18 for imposition of the death penalty, only
two fewer than the eighteen states Atkins
identified as prohibiting execution of the
mentally retarded. If the twelve states and
the District of Columbia that bar the death
penalty entirely are added, the combined
total is twenty-eight states that prohibit
juvenile executions two fewer than the
thirty states that prohibited execution of the
mentally retarded at the time Atkins was
decided.
Moreover, as is the case with the mentally
retarded, the change has consistently been in
the same direction. No state since Stanford
has lowered the age for execution from 18 to
17 or 16, although Stanford allowed states to
do so. Rather, the minimum age has either
stayed the same or been raised, and the only
two states to reinstate the death penalty
since 1989 did so only for those 18 or older.
In addition, many states, including Missouri,
have recently considered legislation to raise
the minimum age for executions to 17 or 18.
This accounts for the most legislative
attention to the issue in twenty years. In
2000, a bill to abolish the death penalty in
New Hampshire passed both houses of the
state legislature, but was vetoed.
2. Infrequency of Imposition of Death
Penalty. In Atkins, the Supreme Court also
found persuasive the fact that execution of
the mentally retarded had become truly
unusual. [... .]
The practice of executing those under 18 has
become similarly uncommon today.
Although twenty-two states theoretically
permit the death penalty for juveniles, only
7
six (Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Georgia,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana) have actually
executed a juvenile offender since Stanford
was decided fourteen years ago. Of these six
states, only three have executed juvenile
offenders since 1993 - Texas, Virginia, and
Oklahoma. [ ... ]
Perhaps most telling is that, while at least
366 juvenile offenders have been executed
in this country since 1642 (when the first
juvenile offender execution occurred), only
twenty-two of the 366 were carried out
during the current era (1973-2003). Of these
twenty-two executions, Texas, Virginia, and
Oklahoma together account for eighty-one
percent of the juvenile executions. Although
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming all theoretically permit the death
penalty for 16-year-olds, and while Florida,
New Hampshire, and North Carolina
theoretically permit it for 17-year-olds, none
of these states has executed a juvenile since
the death penalty was re-established in 1976.
All but South Dakota and New Hampshire,
however, have executed other offenders
during that period. Indeed, even where juries
have imposed a death sentence on a juvenile
since the reinstatement of the death penalty
in 1976, its application has consistently been
reversed by the courts on a variety of
grounds, making South Carolina the only
other state (other than Texas, Louisiana,
Missouri, Georgia, Virginia, and Oklahoma)
to carry out a juvenile execution since 1976.
[. .. [M]ore mentally retarded persons than
juveniles have been executed, in more states,
since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976.
As Atkins noted in regard to the mentally
retarded, in light of the small number of
executions of juvenile offenders carried out
in the last decade, legislatures in states with
a juvenile death penalty may have seen little
reason to pass legislation barring it.
Juveniles are so seldom executed that, other
than perhaps in Texas and Virginia, the
death penalty for juveniles has become so
truly unusual that its potential application is
more hypothetical than real....
3. National and International Consensus.
Opposition to the juvenile death penalty by
professional, social, and religious
organizations has been longstanding. At the
time Stanford was decided, a large number
of groups, including the ABA, child
advocacy groups, psychiatric organizations,
and church and religious groups filed amicus
briefs urging an end to such executions.
Since Stanford, additional organizations of
professionals have also called for an end to
the death penalty, including: The American
Psychiatric Association, The American
Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, The National Mental Health
Association, The National Center for Youth
Law, The Coalition for Juvenile Justice, The
American Humane Association, and The
Constitutional Project. . . . (Listing other
groups who filed briefs amicus curiae in
support of the petitioners in Stanford.)
Additional groups of faith also have issued
statements in opposition to the death
penalty, including: American Baptist
Churches in the USA, American Ethical
Union, American Friends Service
Committee, American Jewish Committee,
Amnesty International, The Bruderhof
Communities, Central Conference of
America, Christian Church (Disciples of
Christ), Church of the Brethren, Church
Women United, The Episcopal Church,
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,
Fellowship of Reconciliation, Friends
Committee on National Legislation, Friends
United Meeting, General Conference of
General Baptists, General Conference
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Mennonite Church, The Mennonite Church,
The Moravian Church in America, YMCA
of the USA, Mormons for Equality and
Social Justice, The Orthodox Church in
America, National Council of the Churches
of Christ, Presbyterian Church (USA), The
Rabbinical Assembly, Reorganized Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
Reformed Church in America, Unitarian
Universalist Association, Union of
American Hebrew Congregations, United
Methodist Church, United Church of Christ,
and United States Catholic Conference. A
recent poll found that only thirty-four
percent of Missourians support the death
penalty for juveniles.
While Stanford found the opposition of
social, professional, and religious groups to
be of little importance, the Court's more
recent decision in Atkins clearly
demonstrated a shift back to reliance on
such evidence to confirm the national
consensus that evolving standards of
decency proscribe imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded.
Similarly, here, although by no means
dispositive, we find the opposition to the
juvenile death penalty of the wide array of
groups within the United States listed above
to be consistent with the legislative and
other evidence that current standards of
decency do not permit the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles.
We also find of note that the views of the
international community have consistently
grown in opposition to the death penalty for
juveniles. Article 37(a) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child and several other international treaties
and agreements expressly prohibit the
practice. According to Amnesty
International, officially sanctioned
executions of juveniles have occurred in
only two other countries in the world in the
last few years, Iran and The Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Of the last seven juvenile
offender executions, five occurred in the
United States.
4. Independent Examination of Death
Penalty. Atkins also undertook an
independent analysis of whether the death
penalty was warranted for mentally retarded
offenders by examining whether the social
purposes intended to be served by the death
penalty, retribution and deterrence, applied
to mentally retarded offenders.
Similarly, as to juveniles, neither retribution
nor deterrence provides an effective
rationale for the imposition of the juvenile
death penalty, and the risk of wrongful
execution of juveniles is enhanced for
reasons similar to that set out in Atkins in
regard to the mentally retarded. [. . .] The
Supreme Court recognized the lesser
culpability and developing nature of the
adolescent mind in its 1988 decision in
Thompson, in which it stated, "there is also
broad agreement on the proposition that
adolescents as a class are less mature and
responsible than adults," and therefore "less
culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile than to a
comparable crime committed by an adult."
Similarly, the deterrence function of the
death penalty can have little application to
juveniles, not just because of their lesser
ability to reason and their lack of informed
judgment, but because, as discussed supra,
the imposition of the death penalty on 16-
year-olds and 17-year-olds has become so
unusual in the last decade that "the
likelihood that the teenage offender has
made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of
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execution is so remote as to be virtually non-
existent." Thompson, (discussing effect of
infrequency of executions of those 15 and
younger).
Finally, as Mr. Simmons notes, the risk of
wrongful execution also is greater as to
younger offenders, who have had less time
to develop ties to the community, less time
to perform mitigating good works, and less
time to develop a stable work history, than is
true of adult offenders, and who are far more
likely than adults to waive their rights and to
give false confessions. Moreover, although
nominally under Missouri law defendants
are permitted to use their youth as a
mitigating factor, this case provides a
graphic illustration of the fact that their
youth can become a further argument
against them. In closing argument in Mr.
Simmons' case, the state argued that the jury
should not let him use his age to protect
himself because if it did so, then he "wins."
The state then argued, "Think about age.
Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary.
Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite
the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary."
Thus, Mr. Simmons' youth was used to
suggest greater immorality and future
dangerousness and so to provide a further
reason to impose the death penalty.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court concludes that
the Supreme Court of the United States
would hold that the execution of persons for
crimes committed when they were under 18
years of age violates the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society," and is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
For the reasons set out above, this Court sets
aside Mr. Simmons' death sentence and re-
sentences him, pursuant to the Court's
authority under Sec. 565.035 RSMo 2000, to
life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation, parole, or release except by act of
the Governor.
WOLFF, Michael A., Judge, concurring:
[. . .] The principal opinion draws a bright
line based on the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. However, if the Supreme
Court of the United States does not agree
with this Court's conclusion that the
standard of decency has evolved to that
point, the issue is certainly appropriate for a
factual determination on a case-by-case
basis. In that event, this Court may wish to
take a cue from the statute's reference to age
and borrow the "presumption" concept from
common law.
An updated version would be: A 16 or 17-
year-old is presumed not to have the
capacity to be fully responsible and,
therefore, eligible for the death penalty. The
state would have the burden of overcoming
the presumption. The issue of responsibility,
in the sense of eligibility for the death
penalty, would become the subject of a jury
finding, rather than a line drawn by the
Court.
Using age as a bright line in juvenile death
penalty cases involving 16 and 17 year-olds
may be considered unreliable because age,
standing alone is not the true relevant factor
as to why it is arguably unjust to impose the
death penalty. "Rather, age is simply a
'proxy' for a combination of factors such as
maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the
capability to assess the possible
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consequences of one's conduct." Because
age does not correspond perfectly to the
combination of relevant factors, its use as a
bright line produces "comparative injustice"
-that is, some may be spared who are fully
capable of receiving the death penalty and
others executed who should have been found
incapable.
The alternative is the adoption of
presumptions with respect to the age of the
murderer in capital cases. [. . .]
Individualized treatment in juvenile death
penalty cases would preserve the capital
sentencing option while eliminating or
diminishing the comparative injustice
problem associated with line-drawing
governed solely according to a defendant's
age.
If the Supreme Court of the United States
does not agree that age 18 is where the line
now should be drawn, the presumption
suggested here should be adopted. This
would not be based on the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments, but rather a state-law
interpretation of the statute that makes "age"
a factor in capital sentencing.
PRICE, Judge, dissenting:
[... .] Our constitutional form of government
allows for the will of the people to be
expressed, for better or worse, through the
laws enacted by their elected
representatives. The role of the courts is
merely to interpret such statutes and to rule
upon their constitutionality, if necessary. [.
The majority opinion of this Court holds that
section 565.020.2 violates the United States
Constitution. This opinion is directly in
conflict with the United States Supreme
Court decision of Stanford v. Kentucky[.] [.
The United States Supreme Court has not
overruled Stanford, even in light of its
decision in Atkins v. Virginia, nor after
recent consideration of the precise
arguments relied upon by the majority of
this Court [.. .] .
This Court is bound by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Stanford v.
Kentucky and simply has no authority to
overrule that decision.
* **
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Court to Decide Young Killers' Fate; Justices to Rule on Executing Juveniles
Chicago Tribune
January 27, 2004
Jan Crawford Greenburg
Just two years after banning the death
penalty for mentally retarded killers, the
Supreme Court announced Monday it will
decide whether the execution of juveniles
who commit murder also violates the
Constitution.
The issue already has divided the court,
which in 1989 upheld executions of people
who were 16 and 17 years old at the time of
their offenses. It refused to rethink that
position in 2002, even though four justices
called for "an end to this shameful practice"
and said such executions were a "relic of the
past."
The decision to take up the case, involving a
Missouri inmate who was 17 when he
murdered a woman, again injects the justices
into the national debate over the death
penalty. It also comes as several justices
have publicly questioned the quality of legal
representation for capital defendants and
whether the process is fairly administered.
Monday's announcement, in the wake of the
court's landmark 2002 ruling against
executing mentally retarded killers, gave
death penalty opponents hope that the court
would once again curb its use.
"The time is clearly right for the court to
take this case," said Diann Rust-Tiemey,
director of the American Civil Liberties
Union's Capital Punishment Project.
"There's a lot of evidence that, as a society,
we've evolved beyond executing juveniles."
Death penalty opponents argue that much
has changed since 1989, when the court
refused to ban capital punishment for
juvenile killers. The justices had ruled in
1988 that the Constitution prohibits
executing those 15 years old or younger, but
said in the 1989 case that there was no
national consensus against executing
juveniles who commit murder at 16 and 17.
But in the years since, six states have
banned executing people who were under 18
at the time of their offenses, bringing to 29
the number of states that prohibit the
practice, including Illinois. No state has
lowered its age of execution from 18 to 17
or 16.
Atkins vs. Virginia
The Supreme Court relied on similar
statistics in June 2002 to prohibit the
execution of mentally retarded criminals. In
that case, Atkins vs. Virginia, the court
overturned a 1989 decision that had allowed
the execution of the mentally retarded.
Richard Dieter, executive director of the
Death Penalty Information Center, said
momentum clearly was against the juvenile
death penalty and that "this is the right time
to take this case and end this kind of
punishment that's become a human rights
issue."
But Missouri Atty. Gen. Jay Nixon, who is
defending the death sentence, said that
decision should be made by state
legislatures, not courts.
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"If the Missouri legislature didn't want
someone [under 18] who committed a
violent murder to receive the death penalty,
they could change Missouri law," Nixon
said. "They have not."
The court announced it would take up the
issue in a case involving Christopher
Simmons, who was sentenced to death for
the murder he committed at 17.
1 Teen's Crime
In September 1993, Simmons and a 15-year-
old accomplice broke into the Fenton, Mo.,
home of Shirley Crook, who was asleep and
alone. When they discovered she had
awakened, they bound her with duct tape
and forced her outside and into her mini-
van.
Simmons drove the van to a railroad trestle
spanning a nearby river, where he and his
accomplice more securely bound Crook's
hands and feet and covered her entire face
with duct tape. Simmons then pushed her,
alive and conscious, off the trestle into the
river.
Simmons was convicted and sentenced to
death, while the other juvenile got life in
prison, Nixon said. But the Missouri
Supreme Court reversed Simmons' death
sentence last summer, holding that the
Constitution barred the juvenile death
penalty and sentenced him instead to life in
prison without parole.
The state court said executing juvenile
killers should be banned for the same
reasons the U.S. Supreme Court outlined in
the Atkins case involving the mentally
retarded.
Court Worried About Risk
It said opposition to the juvenile death
penalty had grown since 1989. It said
"neither retribution nor deterrence provides
an effective rationale" for imposing it. And
it worried about the risk of wrongful
execution of juveniles.
In the Atkins case, Justice John Paul
Stevens, writing for the majority,
emphasized that a national consensus had
emerged among the American public,
legislators, scholars and judges that
executing a mentally retarded criminal is
cruel and unusual punishment, in violation
of the 8th Amendment.
He noted that 30 states, the District of
Columbia and the federal government had
banned executing mentally retarded
criminals. In his opinion, Stevens
emphasized the "dramatic shift" among
states on the issue since 1989, when only
two death penalty states outlawed
executions of the mentally retarded. By
2002, 16 more states had banned the
practice.
But he stopped short of extending that
reasoning to juveniles. Instead, he said there
was not a similar societal shift regarding
execution of juveniles.
Four months after the Atkins ruling, Stevens
took a different approach in the case of
Kentucky inmate Kevin Nigel Stanford, who
had asked the court to ban the execution of
juveniles.
1st Request Rejected
The court had rejected Stanford's arguments
13 years earlier, when it first took up his
case and ruled there was no national
consensus against executing juveniles.
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Stanford, again urging the court to set aside
his death sentence, argued in 2002 that
society's views on the matter had changed
since 1989.
The court declined to intervene in his case,
but Stevens wrote a dissent insisting that a
"national consensus has developed that
juvenile offenders should not be executed."
The practice is "inconsistent with evolving
standards of decency in a civilized society,"
wrote Stevens, who was joined by Justices
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer.
Stevens said the reasons for abolishing the
death penalty for mentally retarded killers
apply with equal or greater force to the
execution of juvenile offenders."
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony
Kennedy, both of whom had joined the
opinion banning execution of the mentally
retarded, did not sign on to Stevens' views
regarding juvenile killers in Stanford's case.
After the court refused to step in,
Kentucky's governor commuted Stanford's
death sentence to life in prison.
Arguments in the Missouri case are expected
to take place this fall, with a decision likely
next year.
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Death Penalty Information Center: Statistics
(available at:: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=882)
JUVENILE OFFENDERS CURRENTLY ON
DEATH ROW, OR EXECUTED, BY STATE
STATE ON DEATH ROW EXECUTED___
FTexas 2[13
Alabama 14-
Airizona50
Louisiana 5 1
Mississippi 0
North Carolina 50
Florida 3 0
South Carolina 3 1
Geo rgi a2
Pennsylvania 2 0
Virginia 1 3
Nevada 1, o
Oklahoma 0 2
Misori 1____- o-Fi_______
Execution information inclusive from 1976 through April 1, 2004. Death Row population figures
as of March 15, 2003.
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Death Penalty Information Center: Statistics
(available at:: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=882)
MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEATH PENALTY BY STATE
MINIMUM AGE
F -
AGE SIXTEEN
(14 states)
AGE
SEVENTEEN
(5 states)
AGE EIGHTEEN
1(19 states and 2
federal
urisdictions)
STATE
Alabama, Arizona*, Arkansas*, Delaware*, Idaho*, Kentucky,
Louisiana*, Mississippi*, Nevada, Oklahoma*, Pennsylvania*, South
Carolina*, Utah*, Virginia
Florida, Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York*,
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wyoming, Federal
civilian government, Federal military
* New York's death penalty statute was ruled unconstitutional on June 24,
2004.
Express minimum age in statute, unless otherwise indicated:
* Minimum age required by U.S. Constitution per U.S. Supreme Court in Thompson v.
Oklahoma (1988)
# Minimum age required by Florida Constitution per Florida Supreme Court in Brennan v. State
(1999). Florida's minimum age may have been lowered to 16 by a 2002 referendum.
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Death Penalty Information Center: Statistics
(available at:: http://www.deathpcnaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=882)
AGE AT WHICH ALL SUSPECTS ARE TRIED AS ADULTS
AGE
SIXTEEN AND
ABOVE (3 states)
SEVENTEEN AND
ABOVE (9 states)
EIGHTEEN AND
ABOVE (38 states plus
the District of
Columbia)
STATE
Connecticut, New York, North Carolina
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, Wisconsin
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, plus the
District of Columbia
(source: Pamela Ferdinand, "Seventeen an Awkward Age, N.H. Juvenile Justice Finds,"
Washington Post, Mar. 27, 2002, citing the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Programs)
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Jury Will Get Case of Drowning Death
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
June 16, 1994
Leo Fitzmaurice
Jurors are expected to begin deliberations
today after prosecutors completed their case
Wednesday against Christopher Simmons,
18, in the kidnapping and murder of a
woman from the Fenton area who was
thrown into the Meramec River.
Shirley Crook's body was found by anglers
on Sept. 9, 1993. Prosecutors contend Crook
was abducted from her home, bound and
gagged by Simmons and Charles Benjamin,
16.
The youths, who live near Fenton, are
accused of taking Crook in her van and
throwing her into the river from a railroad
trestle near Castlewood State Park in
southwest St. Louis County.
Prosecutors contend that Crook was alive
when she was thrown off the bridge and
drowned.
Simmons is charged with first-degree
murder, burglary, kidnapping and stealing in
Crook's death. George B. McElroy, the
prosecutor, is seeking the death penalty.
Last month, Benjamin was found guilty of
first-degree murder in the case. He had been
certified to stand trial as an adult. He is
scheduled to be sentenced next month.
Steven Crook, a truck driver, testified he last
talked to his wife on Sept. 8 by telephone
while he was driving his truck out of town.
The Crooks were employed by the same
trucking company, and his wife was
scheduled to work the next day. When he
called back later, she did not answer.
Steven Crook testified he went to the
couple's house on Pine Ridge Drive and
found some damage inside. He said that the
couple's poodle was whimpering when he
arrived and that he found the dog wrapped in
duct tape on the bed in the master bedroom.
Dr. Ronald Turgeon, of the St. Louis County
Medical Examiner's Office, testified that
Shirley Crook's face had been bound with
duct tape with only an area for her nose
visible. He said he found 29 bruises on her
body and four fractured ribs. He said the
cause of death was drowning.
Brian Moomey, 29, a former convict,
testified that he overheard Simmons and
Benjamin during a party at his trailer
discussing burglarizing a house and killing a
family. He said the two hung around at his
house, where he said he had a party every
night. The trailer court is across from the
Crook residence.
Moomey testified that the next night,
Simmons had bragged about killing a
woman because she saw his face. Testimony
revealed that Shirley Crook and Simmons
previously had been involved in an auto
accident.
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Jurors Consider Death For Woman's Killer
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
June 18, 1994
Leo Fitzmaurice
Prosecutor George B. McElroy had three
words of advice for the jury deciding the
fate of a man convicted of pushing a woman
from a railroad trestle: "Give him death."
Jurors in Jefferson County Circuit Court in
Hillsboro deliberated more than six hours
Friday on whether Christopher Simmons,
18, should be sentenced to death or to life in
pison.
Simmons was convicted Thursday of killing
Shirley Ann Crook. She drowned after she
was pushed into the Meramec River last
September.
In his closing arguments in the trial's
penalty phase, McElroy told the jurors they
needed to send a message.
"The killing has got to stop," he said. "The
fear has got to end. The violence has got to
stop."
Defense attorney Michael Burton asked for
mercy for Simmons.
"Your decision should not be based on
emotion but on facts," Burton said. "On the
other hand, if you consider any emotion,
consider mercy and compassion."
Simmons and a friend, Charles Benjamin,
16, both of the Fenton area, were accused of
breaking into the Crooks' home near Fenton
on Sept. 9. They surprised Shirley Crook,
46, who was alone.
Prosecutors said they abducted Crook,
bound and gagged her and pushed her into
the river near Castlewood State Park in
southwest St. Louis County.
Benjamin was convicted as an adult of first-
degree murder last month; he is scheduled to
be sentenced in July.
Relatives and friends gave emotional
testimony about Crook and Simmons during
the two-hour hearing.
Her husband, Steven Crook, said his wife
was the center of the family.
He described his wife as a loving person
who "accepted everyone because she knew
everyone made mistakes."
Steven Crook said he could not go into the
couple's former home because it reminds
him of his wife.
Christopher Simmons' mother, Sherly
Hayes, said her two sons by a second
marriage love their brother. She described
how Simmons had visited his grandmother
in a nursing home after she had suffered a
stroke.
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Psychiatrists Question Death for Teen Killers
The Wall Street Journal
May 26, 2004
Paul Davies
In 1993, when 17-year-old Christopher
Simmons abducted and murdered his
neighbor, little did he know that some of the
nation's top brain researchers and
psychiatrists would one day rush to his
defense before the Supreme Court.
Emerging scientific research is shedding
light on what people have long suspected:
The brain changes dramatically during
adolescence and these changes may account
for the impulsive, often irrational behaviors
seen in some teenagers. Now psychiatrist,
lawyers and lawmakers are using this
emerging science to argue that such
adolescent brain changes should be
considered as mitigating factors when
teenagers are being sentenced to the death
penalty. The Supreme Court has agreed to
take up the Simmons case this fall to
reconsider whether executing people for
crimes committed when they were 16 or 17
is "cruel and unusual punishment."
Although the Supreme Court in 1989 set the
minimum age for the death penalty at 16, the
American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, the American
Psychiatric Association and the American
Society for Adolescent Psychiatry recently
issued statements opposing capital
punishment for juveniles. They plan to file a
joint legal brief on Mr. Simmons' behalf to
the Supreme Court. The groups haven't
taken a stand on the death penalty for adults.
Nineteen states still permit executions of
convicts as young as 16; most recently, Sean
Sellers of Oklahoma was executed in 1999
at the age of 29 for a murder committed
when he was 16. Nationwide, 73 people are
on death row for crimes they committed
when they were youths, and 22 have been
put to death since the high court ruling
reinstituted the death penalty in 1976. Last
year, two people who committed crimes
while they were under age 18 were
sentenced to death.
In 1993, Mr. Simmons and Charles
Benjamin, who was 15, broke into a
neighbor's home in Fenton, Mo. Once inside
they encountered owner Shirley Ann Crook.
Fearing she would recognize them, they
bound Ms. Crook, 46, with duct tape and an
electrical cord, drove her to a railroad bridge
and shoved her into the Meramec River,
where she drowned.
Mr. Benjamin, who was too young to face
the death penalty, was sentenced to life in
prison. Mr. Simmons was convicted of
murder and sent to death row. He told
friends he thought he could get away with
the crime because he was a minor, according
to the Missouri attorney general. Last
summer, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled
that Mr. Simmons' death sentence violated
the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment
against cruel and unusual punishment and
that Mr. Simmons was too young to be held
fully responsible for his crime.
The legal argument is expected to center
around the what previous Supreme Court
rulings have called the "evolving standard of
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decency," or the notion that as a society
matures, so does its notion of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
(Congo, Iran, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia are
the only other countries with a juvenile
death penalty.)
Part of the argument against juvenile
executions will focus on how developing
brains in juveniles differ from adults. Such
research helped persuade lawmakers in
some states to vote to raise the age for the
death penalty to 18.
"Kids may know the difference between
right and wrong, but that does not stop them
from doing dumb and dangerous things that
they would never think of doing as adults,"
said David Fassler, a child psychiatrist and
professor of psychiatry at the University of
Vermont.
Proponents of this argument contend that
because the part of the brain that might
inhibit criminal behavior isn't fully
developed, teens lack the ability to make
sound decisions and are more prone to
impulsive behavior. They agree the crimes
are horrible, and those convicted should be
punished, but not be put to death.
The psychiatrists point to brain research that
shows that the frontal lobe, the part of the
brain that controls reason, develops last.
Researchers at David Geffin School of
Medicine at the University of California at
Los Angeles, Harvard Medical School and
the National Institute of Mental Health and
elsewhere have conducted a series of studies
in recent years that "map" the development
of the brain from childhood to adulthood.
Using magnetic resonance imaging, the
researchers have been able to scan the
brains of children in different age groups to
compile three-dimensional images that track
the brain's development. They found that
the amygdala, the more primitive part of the
brain responsible for impulse and emotion,
controls decision-making into early
adulthood.
The researchers found that a small area in
the frontal lobe of the brain - known as the
prefrontal cortex - controls the most
advanced functions of the brain and is the
last part to develop. The prefrontal cortex is
located just behind the forehead and is
known as the "CEO" of the body, because it
allows humans to plan, anticipate
consequences, control impulses, prioritize
thoughts and think in the abstract. This part
of the brain continues to develop for
individuals into their 20s.
So far, the researchers haven't demonstrated
a direct link between brain development and
behavior, and death-penalty advocates are
challenging what research already exists.
"There is science, and then there is junk
science," said Dianne Clements, president of
Justice for All, a Houston nonprofit victim-
advocacy group. "This is an effort by those
in the scientific community who oppose the
death penalty to use science to argue their
position."
Ms. Clements said case facts show teens
who kill realize their actions were wrong
because they often try to cover up and
destroy evidence to avoid getting caught.
What's more, most relatives of murder
victims don't think a killer's age at the time
of the crime should result in a lesser
sentence, she said.
But some lawmakers think a criminal's age
should be taken into account. "It's just
intuitive," said Cale Case, a Wyoming
Republican state senator who co-sponsored
a bill that raised the minimum age for the
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state's death penalty to 18. "I had two teen-
age daughters, and one was very
compulsive. But they have become very
responsible adults."
Stephen Harper, an assistant public defender
in Miami who has represented juveniles
facing capital punishment, also notes science
is often ahead of the law. He pointed out
how the courts were slow to embrace the use
of DNA evidence linking individuals to
crimes.
"If you just focus on how horrible the crime
was, a lot of people do not care how old the
offender was," Mr. Harper said. "But the
brain research begins to demonstrate that
adolescents are less culpable than adults."
Nevertheless, some scientists say the
research isn't complete. "I don't think it is
there yet, but we are working on it," said
Elizabeth Sowell, a professor of neurology
at UCLA. "I think what we have found is
relevant and the court may want to consider
it. But there is no absolute proof. I think the
scientists who say the evidence to date
should be used to end the death penalty [for
juveniles] may be going out on a limb."
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Supreme Court Passes on Case of a Teen on Death Row; Four Justices Have Called
Execution of Young Killers "Shameful," But Have Yet to Press the Issue Further.
The Philadelphia Inquirer
January 28, 2003
Anne Gearan, Associated Press
Four Supreme Court justices want to ban the
execution of very young killers, but
apparently they cannot persuade their
colleagues to reopen the debate.
The court did not comment in turning down
an appeal yesterday from Oklahoma death-
row inmate Scott Allen Hain, who was 17
when he helped burn a young couple alive in
the trunk of their car.
Death-penalty opponents had hoped the
court would use the case to broaden a review
of how the punishment is carried out and
who belongs on death row.
Lawyers said the four-member liberal wing
of the court knows that the time is not right
to revisit whether 16- and 17-year-olds are
as culpable as adult killers, and that they
could be outvoted if the full court took on
the issue now.
"We're not there yet," said Steven Hawkins,
executive director of the National Coalition
to Abolish the Death Penalty. For now, he
said, "there is not a fifth vote for change."
In October, the four issued an unusual
statement, calling it "shameful" to execute
juvenile killers.
"The practice of executing such offenders is
a relic of the past and is inconsistent with
evolving standards of decency in a civilized
society," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote,
joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
The statement echoed the court's 6-3 ruling
last year that. executing mentally retarded
defendants was unconstitutional. In both
instances, the constitutional question turns
on the defendants' ability to understand their
situation and their level of culpability.
The ruling excluding retarded defendants
from the death penalty relied heavily on the
premise that public attitudes had changed on
the subject in the 13 years since the court
last upheld such executions.
In 1989, two states that used capital
punishment had outlawed it for retarded
defendants. In 2002, 18 states prohibited it.
The shift was apparently enough to win the
votes of swing voters Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony M. Kennedy, who joined
Stevens and the three others.
Death-penalty opponents said they needed
the same kind of momentum among state
legislatures on the question of young killers
and said the high court would get involved
when more states outlawed the death penalty
for those under 18.
Of the 38 states that allow the death penalty,
16, including New Jersey, prohibit it for
those who were under 18 at the time of their
crimes. The federal government also bans
capital punishment for juveniles prosecuted
in federal court.
"This means we press on," said Stephen K.
Harper of the Juvenile Death Penalty
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Initiative, a coalition of death-penalty
opponents and the American Bar
Association that is working to change state
laws. "We have to make a stronger
argument with respect to changes in state
legislatures... so we can make a more
convincing case to the Supreme Court."
Bills to ban the death penalty for those who
were juveniles at the time of their crimes are
before legislators in Wyoming,
Pennsylvania and Mississippi, with several
more states expected to review the issue this
year or next, lawyers said.
Dianne Clements of the victims' rights
group Justice for All said capital-
punishment opponents might be overly
optimistic. State juries tend to impose the
death penalty for young killers only in the
most horrific cases, she said.
The case of Washington-area sniper suspect
John Lee Malvo, 17, might dampen any
momentum to treat young killers more
lightly, she added.
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In Virginia, Convicts Find They're Not Too Young to Die;
Jury Spares Malvo, But Another Teen Killer Waits on Death Row
The Washington Post
December 24, 2003
Reilly Capps
In 1994, Shermaine Ali Johnson was 16; still
too young to play the lottery, too young to
buy a dirty magazine, too young to vote.
But that summer, he committed a murder for
which a jury said he will have to die.
"He was a skinny kid when he came in,"
says his lawyer, Cary Bowen. "Now he's
husky, he's built. Living on death row just
does something to you."
Raised by his grandmother in New York,
Johnson was sent to live that summer with
relatives and friends in New Jersey and
Virginia. Instead, he bounced around
looking for a home.
"His grandma - she was the only person in
the world who truly loved him," said John
H. Cobb Jr., who represented Johnson at his
trial. But, he said, "She knew something was
wrong with him."
Johnson ended up staying with a friend of
the family in Virginia. One night, he and the
woman were sitting on a couch watching a
movie. He went upstairs and returned with a
knife from the kitchen. Then he raped her
while her children slept upstairs. Less than a
month later, he raped another woman. He
was convicted of both crimes and sentenced
to 100 years in prison.
That same summer, 22-year-old Hope
Denise Hall was found naked in her
apartment, stabbed 15 times. She was a
young, single mother who worked for a local
TV station as an associate producer. Her
killing went unsolved for two years.
Then a new technology helped identify
Johnson as her killer. Searching the state's
new DNA computer database, investigators
linked him to semen found at the crime
scene.
Already in jail, Johnson was arrested, tried
and sentenced to death.
Though he had confessed to one of the
earlier rapes, he denied killing Hall.
"I'm sorry for the people I hurt - I really am
- but that's all I can really say to the people
I hurt," he told a court last year, begging to
have his death sentence commuted to life in
prison. "I'm a grown man now, a different
person. I was lost at the time."
Lee Boyd Malvo escaped death yesterday
with a Virginia jury's recommendation that
he be sentenced to life in prison, without
parole. That leaves Johnson alone on death
row in one of the last states in the country
that has been willing to execute juvenile
offenders.
Over the past five years, Virginia has
executed three juvenile criminals by lethal
injection. One big reason the death penalty
remains is Robert F. Horan Jr., the Fairfax
County Commonwealth's Attorney who
prosecuted Malvo. Over his career, Horan
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has won a dozen death sentences, including
one for a juvenile.
He was Dwayne Allen Wright, whom Horan
prosecuted for a 1989 rampage of armed
robbery, carjacking and attempted rape that
left two people dead and another wounded.
Wright, 17 at the time of the crime, was
executed in October 1998.
In 2000, Virginia rang in the new year with
two executions in the span of three days.
Douglas Christopher Thomas was 17 when
he gunned down his girlfriend's parents in
their sleep in Middlesex County. Steve
Roach was 17 when he shot his 70-year-old
neighbor, Mary Ann Hughes, in her home in
Stanardsville. Both Thomas and Roach were
executed as adults.
Because it's exceedingly difficult to win
death penalty appeals in Virginia, the state's
death penalty remains one of the nation's
surest and swiftest. Since 1976, of the five
juveniles sentenced to death in Virginia,
three have been executed. (One had his
sentence commuted to life in prison.)
But America's desire to put young criminals
to death may be waning. In the 1990s, states
sentenced, on average, more than 10
juveniles to death each year. This year, only
one state sentenced a teenager to death, said
Victor Streib, law professor at Ohio
Northern University and a leading expert on
the death penalty for juvenile killers.
Even in Virginia, which has executed more
criminals than any other state except Texas
since 1976, juries have become less likely to
impose the ultimate punishment on
criminals. Streib believes that the U.S.
Supreme Court will decide in the next 10 to
15 years to abolish the practice. The end of
the death penalty for juveniles may be
nearer.
"The trend is extremely strong to abolish it -
whether prosecutors are less willing to bring
death penalty charges, or juries are
unwilling to put juveniles to death, or
because governors are more likely to grant
clemency," Streib said. "If it weren't for
Malvo it would have been gone already."
The Supreme Courts of Missouri and
Kentucky recently issued landmark
decisions. The Missouri case, which ruled
against the juvenile death penalty in all
cases, is expected to rise to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
In Malvo's case, most Americans wanted to
see him sentenced to life without parole,
according to an ABC News poll released last
week. He could still face the death penalty
in other jurisdictions.
Prince William Commonwealth's Attorney
Paul B. Ebert said he hoped to try Malvo
next.
"If we prosecute him it's very likely we'd
ask a jury to consider death," Ebert said.
And so, Malvo may yet join Johnson on
Virginia's death row.
Johnson lives in a 6-by-10-foot cell at
Sussex One prison in Waverly. He watches
TV and takes visits from his cousins and his
grandmother. No date has been set for his
execution. He's hoping an appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court will be successful,
his lawyer said.
"It's terrible to have hope at the Virginia
Supreme Court," Bowen scoffed. "But it's
the only hope we've got."
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